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Comment by Wolfgang Streeck*
High Equality, Low Activity: The Contribution of the Social Welfare System
to the Stability of the German Collective Bargaining Regime
The main trend on which employment
systems are converging worldwide is, ac-
cording to Katz and Darbishire, an increase
in internal diversity accompanied by rising
inequality. Like many of us, the authors
feel more than a little uncomfortable with
what they observe. The national industrial
relations systems ofthe postwar period were
cherished precisely for their capacity to
guarantee all workers a common floor of
rights and conditions shielded from the
pressures and vagaries of the market. In
this way, they not only protected social
peace but also helped generate a distribu-
tion of life chances less dispersed and more
egalitarian than unmediated market forces
would have produced. The big question
for the future, the book makes clear, is
whether we can invent institutions and poli-
cies for the emerging new employment sys-
tems that will be capable of performing the
equalizing functions that were once so suc-
cessfully performed by classical industrial
relations.
As Katz and Darbishire argue, growing
diversity and inequality within national
employment systems make for declining
differences between them, and thus for a
trend toward international convergence.
Still, differences persist, not least with re-
gard to the level of inequality national sys-
tems are disposed to admit. Katz and
Darbishire report, correctly, that wage dis-
persion in Germany not only has been tra-
ditionally low (p. 219), but also remained
unchanged in the 1980s when it increased
just about everywhere else, and rose only
slightly even in the 1990s (pp. 220-21). In
their concluding remarks on the German
case, Katz and Darbishire celebrate the sta-
bility of German industrial relations insti-
tutions, including the remarkable staying
•Wolfgang Streeck is Professor of Sociology and
Director at the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of
Societies.
power of unions and collective bargaining
in the face of pressures for "deregulation,"
on the assumption that such stability and
staying power account for the relatively
slow increase in inequality in Germany.
This, in turn, is seen as in keeping with the
promises of labor-inclusive postwar indus-
trial relations, and therefore as normatively
desirable.
My comment, I am afraid, will pour more
than a little vinegar into the wine of Katz
and Darbishire's surprisingly sanguine
analysis of the German case. I will not
contest their claim that the still compara-
tively low German wage spread has to do
with German institutions of industrial rela-
tions and their high stability. Nor will I
argue, as many do, that a narrow wage
spread has necessarily become incompat-
ible with high employment and is therefore
no longer a desirable policy goal. In fact,
Dutch inequality has risen only slightly in a
period when unemployment has fallen and
employment risen dramatically, and Den-
mark manages to be a highly egalitarian
society and a full employment one at the
same time. What I will say, however, draw-
ing on the German example, is that there
are ways of defending equality in employ-
ment that come at a high price both eco-
nomically and socially, and indeed may
perversely generate new and severe inequali-
ties that are not immediately visible in the
usual employment statistics. High observed
equality, in other words, may not always be
as good a thing as it seems; in fact, it may
hide deep inequalities that make the politi-
cal and economic arrangements sustaining
it in the longer run unsustainable, not just
politically and economically, but also mor-
ally. To see why this might be so, and why
I think it is so in the Germany of today, one
needs to do what Katz and Darbishire ne-
glect to do: look not just at industrial
relations, but also at social welfare systems
and, most important, the interaction be-
tween the two.
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In brief, what the German case illustrates
is that one way in which a labor-inclusive
industrial relations system may defend high
equality—and in so doing, incidentally,
contribute to high overall productivity—is
by depressing the rate of economic activity,
or, more precisely: of statistically observ-
able formal, primary sector activity. More
specifically, an industrial country that man-
ages to have no growth or only little growth
in service sector employment will have a
lower wage spread, as well as higher aggre-
gate productivity. The same happens if
employment in the industrial sector is al-
lowed to decline. Since this will eliminate
the less productive jobs and workers, it will
result in higher average productivity and,
ceteris paribus, higher equality among those
allowed to remain in the work force. All it
takes to stifle service sector expansion and
weed out less productive manufacturing is
a safely institutionalized egalitarian wage-
setting system, underpinned by a support-
ive social security system that provides for a
high reservation wage, with strong unions
and effective cross-sectoral coordination,
operating in competitive international
markets and governed by a state without a
"Keynesian capacity" and facing tight bud-
get constraints. Of course, to avoid politi-
cal discontent, ways must be found to take
care of the casualties: those expelled from
employment and those prevented from
entering it. As I will point out below, this is
indeed at the core of the politics of what
may be called a high-equality, low-activity
employment regime.
Germany, I maintain, is one of the fore-
most examples of such a regime, and the
size and importance of the country may
justify looking at it in more detail. Low
wage dispersion, as Katz and Darbishire
point out, reflects an impressive continuity
of a system of sectoral wage bargaining with
very high coverage and strong intersectoral
linkage. But it also goes together with a low
overall rate of labor force participation, at
71.2% in 1999, compared to 73.6% in the
Netherlands (!), 76.3% in the United King-
dom, 77.2% in the United States, and 80.6%
in Denmark, Moreover, participation ef-
fectively declined in the 1990s, a decade
during which it increased in the Nether-
lands by no less than seven percentage
points.'
Low participation—or, which is the same,
high exclusiveness of the German employ-
ment system—is accompanied by high and
stable unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment, which in 1998 accounted
for more than half of the registered unem-
ployed (OEGD Employment Outlook 1999),
making for an overall rate of inactivity of
35,5% in 1999.2 Remarkably, the rate of
inactivity in Germany increased during most
of the 1990s, while the OECD average im-
proved by more than three percentage
points between 1994 and 1999 (OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook, Statistical Compendium
1/200).' But as we shall see, this is not the
only pathology of the German high-equal-
ity, low-activity employment system, and
maybe not even the most crippling one.
Before I continue I would like to make
clear that German unemployment (or, more
important, low activity) is not due to low
competitiveness of the German economy—
and certainly not low competitiveness of' its
internationally exposed manufacturing sec-
tor. In 1999, Germany achieved its highest
trade surplus ever. While industrial em-
ployment in manufacturing is shrinking, as
it is everywhere, it is doing so comparatively
slowly, and overall it remains higher than
'The West German participation rate in 1990 was
69,1%, German unification raised the rate of partici-
pation by no more than 2 percentage points, al-
though participation in the former DDR had been at
a Scandinavian level (OEGD Labor Force Statistics
1998; OEGD Employment Outlook 2000),
^The rate of inactivity is the percentage of the
working age population that is not gainfully em-
ployed, for whatever reason. It includes the unem-
ployed,
''Between 1985 and 1999, the German inactivity
rate declined by 2,5 percentage points. In the same
period, it fell by 12 percentage points in the Nether-
lands, by 5 in the United Kingdom, and by 7 in the
United States, In 1999, inactivity rates in Denmark,
the United States, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland
were at least 10 percentage points lower than in
Germany,
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in most other industrialized countries.''
Large German firms, from Daimler-Chrysler
to Siemens, are highly prosperous and will
continue to be so, however international
competition may develop. The crisis of
German capitalism, if there is one, is not a
crisis of the German industrial sector.
This is not to say that industry is not in
some way part of the problem. Due pre-
cisely to the historical success of the Ger-
man manufacturing sector, its organiza-
tions continue to set the terms of employ-
ment and social security for the German
economy as a whole. IG Metall, the metal-
workers' union, is only slowly relinquishing
its role as wage leader and pattern setter.
Its yearly wage claims are traditionally based
on the increase in national average produc-
tivity, allegedly out of "solidarity" with
unions and workers in other sectors, but
certainly also to legitimate its claim for
hegemony within the union movement, as
well as to unify its own, heterogeneous
membership behind a generally acceptable
pay formula,^ Of course, if the service
sector were to grow significantly, the gap
between the productivity increase in the
nation at large and that in the metal sector
would widen, and IG Metall would have to
become a sectoral union among others,
rather than a general union in disguise.
As long, however, as service sector unions
are pressured by their members and
middle-level officials to follow the lead of
IG Metall and settle near the metal agree-
ment, thus keeping the intersectoral wage
spread narrow, this is unlikely to happen,
as national pattern bargaining has made
the "cost disease" (Baumol 1967) of the
••At the end of the 1990s German employment in
manufacturing (ISIC 3) accounted for 14,5% of the
population of working age, compared to 11,3% in
France, 11.8% in the United States, and 13,2% in the
United Kingdom (OEGD Labour Force Statistics),
^Given the high internal diversity of the metal
sector, wage demands based on metal sector produc-
tivity rises might appear excessive to members in
smaller and less productive firms. They would also
make compromise with the employer association more
difficult.
service sector a chronic condition of the
German economy.
Moreover, while German manufacturing
still provides a comparatively large number
of jobs, one reason for its high productivity
and its resulting high competitiveness is
slowly declining employment. Firms and
sectors may increase their productivity not
just by improving their technology or the
training of their work force, but also by
shedding labor. For German industrial
employers, this became the method of
choice especially in the restructuring pe-
riod of the mid-1990s.^
Why labor-shedding on a grand scale was
possible despite strong employment pro-
tection law and well-entrenched unions can
be understood only if one takes into ac-
count the operation of the social security
system. Generous unemployment benefits
and ample opportunities for older workers
to move directly from unemployment into
early retirement allowed unions and works
councils to tolerate extensive downsizing
and enabled employers to externalize to
the public the costs of social peace in a
period of deep restructuring. Ironically,
the productivity increases brought about
through cooperative downsizing were in
subsequent wage rounds invoked by the
union asjustification for high wage claims.
With the public picking up the bill, egali-
tarian wage bargaining thus happily pro-
ceeded, for a declining work f'orce em-
ployed by ever "leaner" and increasingly
more productive and competitive enter-
prises.'
^For example, in 1994 nominal wages rose by 3,4%
while unit labor costs increased by only 0,5%, As the
Sachverstaendigenrat (the Gouncil of Economic Advis-
ers) has pointed out, part of the productivity increase
that made this possible was caused by labor shedding.
This situation continued at least until 1997, Between
1993 and 1998 industrial employment fell roughly
12%, from 14 million to 12,3 million (OEGD Labour
Force Statistics 1999),
'In the service sector, correspondingly, union lead-
ers continued to be able to follow more or less the
lead of IG Metall, as less productive employment that
might have forced them to moderate wage demands
or accept lower settlements was never allowed to
emerge in the first place.
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The institutional configuration that
made this possible had slowly evolved dur-
ing the 1980s. The demise of the Keynesian
illusion—which had been more short-lived
in Germany than in other countries—had
sent the government searching for alterna-
tives to fiscal or monetary expansion, to
deal with the negative employment effects
of a wage-setting system designed to gener-
ate high wages and low wage dispersion at
the same time. Faced with a strong union
movement, and therefore prevented from
adopting Thatcherist recipes, the Kohl gov-
ernment soon discovered the old age pen-
sion system as an instrument to balance the
labor market, this time by reducing supply
rather than by increasing demand.* iG
Metall, perhaps remembering its fight in
the 1970s for "humanization of work"—a
program that included not just employ-
ment protection for older workers but also
an organization of work geared to their
special needs and abilities—originally
pressed for a general cut in working hours
(which, as it was to come with full mainte-
nance of pay, in the end amounted to just
another productivity drive bound to create
even more surplus labor). However, to
avoid defeat in the long strike of 1984 for
the 35-hour-week, the union had to accept
far-reaching "flexibility" provisions, with
respect to working time and work organiza-
tion. As a result, it effectively lost control
over the wage-effort-bargain at the work-
place.
In subsequent years, employers found
themselves able to live with high wage settle-
ments by raising productivity almost at will—
I^n fact, not only the pension system. An institu-
tion that became almost as important, in time, was a
system called "active labor market policy," funded
from unemployment insurance contributions and
originally conceived to provide training and other
assistance to help the unemployed quickly move back
into employment. In the 1980s and, even more so, the
1990s, this turned into a much-used device to main-
tain people outside gainful employment without hav-
ing to pay them unemployment benefits or social
assistance. Participants in active labor market policy
programs do not statistically count as unemployed.
which as a side-effect made them less pre-
pared to drive a hard wage bargain and risk
a strike. And unions, in the metal industry
and elsewhere, learned that to continue to
be successful in solidaristic-egalitarian high-
wage bargaining, they only had to accept a
subsequent thinning-out of the work force—
which they could do without encountering
much resistance by their members as long
as they, together with employers interested
in social peace, made sure that the govern-
ment kept open the easy road to early re-
tirement. The "productivity coalition" that
used to be the hallmark of the German
"social system of production" in the 1970s
(Streeck 1992) thus assumed a wholly new
meaning.
The story of how the German welfare
state was enlisted to support high-wage,
high-equality collective bargaining by de-
activating growing segments of the work
force is long and complex and cannot be
recounted here (see Manow and Seils 2000),
The event that both solidified and
radicalized the emerging pattern of the
1980s, and for a long time safely entrenched
it, was German unification. In the name of
equality, but also to protect themselves from
low-wage competition. West German unions
and employer associations agreed immedi-
ately after unity to transfer the entire West
German system of industrial relations to
the East, including, after a short transition
period. West German wages. The inevi-
table result was very high unemployment,
which has continued ever since. But be-
cause the West German welfare state—pen-
sions, unemployment insurance, labor mar-
ket policy and all—had also been extended
wholesale to East Germany, those whose
jobs had been sacrificed on the altar of
equality could be paid high unemployment
benefits, placed on early pensions, or ab-
sorbed into training and assistance pro-
grams under the government's "active la-
bor market policy" (see footnote 8), When
during the 1990s Eastern wages climbed up
to Western levels, as agreed between unions
and employer associations, the social insur-
ance system became the vehicle of a gigan-
tic West-East wealth transfer. Since its main
source of revenue is social security contri-
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butions, the bulk of the costs of unification
was borne basically by West German work-
ers and employers, sparing the government
the need to raise income or corporate taxes.
For the "social partners," rising payroll taxes
and non-wage labor costs apparently seemed
a price worth paying for either wage equal-
ity or the elimination of low-wage competi-
tion or both—that is, for the survival be-
yond unification of West German social
partnership and high-wage, high-equality
collective bargaining.
Even today, unions continue to press for
wage equalization in the East, notwithstand-
ing 17% unemployment, a further 10% in
"active labor market policy" programs, and
average productivity only about 60% as high
as that in West Germany (Sachverstaen-
digenrat 1999:87). As a result. East Ger-
many has become structurally dependent
on whatmay originally have been conceived
as a set of provisional stopgaps for a tempo-
rary emergency. Unemployment benefits,
social assistance, and paid training pro-
grams for jobs that never materialize have
for an entire decade now been the primary
source of income for entire families and
local communities. Many counties and city
governments in the East could not perform
some of their most elementary functions
without the temporary employment pro-
grams run by the Labor Office for the long-
term unemployed, which are mostly funded
out of payroll taxes. In large parts of East
Germany, the Labor Office has become by
far the largest "employer." Any attempt to
cut expenditures on what is still called "ac-
tive" labor market policy—although it serves
mainly to maintain people inactive outside
the labor market—is vigorously opposed by
the governments of the five Eastern Lander
whose local economies would collapse with-
out West German compensation for the
failure of their high-wage, high-equality
labor markets to generate a decent level of
employment.* Economically, politically.
importance of "labor market policy" for East
Germany has become a general excuse for its ineffi-
ciencies, and in particular its failure to attain what is
supposedly its principal objective: moving people
and electorally, the "East German ques-
tion"—the need to take care of East Ger-
mans excluded both from and by the West
German employment system—has become
practically intractable and almost a taboo
subject in elite political discourse.
Generally, German politics and society
have been quite inventive in disposing of
what, under the German employment re-
gime, is a huge mass of surplus labor. The
bad news is, however, that most of the tech-
niques that were developed in the 1980s
and 1990s are now meeting their limits. For
a long time, an important storage facility
for surplus labor in Germany has been the
household. But although the economic
participation rate of women, at 55.8%, is
still comparatively low, being about 15 per-
centage points below that in the United
States or Scandinavia (OECD Employment
Outlook 1999), generational change is in-
exorably increasing the female labor sup-
ply, and keeping women out of the labor
market is becoming politically more risky.'"
Similarly, throughout the 1990s the univer-
sities, attendance in which is free, were a
favorite holding pen for young people who
might otherwise have looked for employ-
ment. As a result, the number of students
doubled in twenty years, and so did the
student-professor ratio as the state had no
money to spare. By the end of the century,
German students were on average 28.8 years
old upon receiving their first degree. There
are many obvious reasons why this cannot
continue, and indeed pressure is building
to shorten the time spent in education, not
least by introducing student fees.
More visible, but certainly not less ex-
pensive, was the contribution to labor sup-
ply management of the social security sys-
back into employment as soon as possible. Unifica-
tion has made it possible officially to attribute to
labor market policy the additional function of "pre-
serving social peace," in the East but by extension also
in the West, This makes any meaningful evaluation of
its performance impossible,
'"But note that while the female participation rate,
due to unification, increased between 1990 and 1991
by 3,7 percentage points, to 56,9%, it has continu-
ously declined since then!
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tem. Early retirement reduced the German
activity rate of those aged 55-64 to 39% in
1998, compared to 71% and 58% in Swit-
zerland and the United States, respectively
(OECD EmploymentOutlook 1998,2000)."
"Active labor market policy" programs,
which in 1999 absorbed about 770,000
people who would otherwise have added to
the number of unemployed, cost about 45
billion DM, equivalent to 1.2% of GDP,'^
And unemployment benefits may run for
up to 32 months now, followed if necessary
by unemployment assistance, which can be
paid indefinitely, or by direct transition
into one of several forms of early retire-
ment. " Most of this is funded by unemploy-
"Pension statistics are notoriously difficult to in-
terpret. But the extent to which the pension system
was used to take labor out of the market is reflected in
the fact that between 1990 and 1998, the percentage
of new pensioners who retired at the supposedly
normal age of 65 fell from 34,7% to 22,8%, During
the same period, the percentage of those who were
allowed to retire at age 60, after a prolonged spell of
unemployment, rose from 7,8% to 17,4%, with apeak
of 22,7% in 1995 (data from Verband der Rentenver-
sicherungstraeger).
'^Paid by the federal unemployment insurance
system. An additional DM 10 billion are estimated to
come from various Lander programs and the Euro-
pean Social Fund, The foremost expert on German
labor market policy, Guenther Schmid, considers its
funding structure "a jungle" (personal communica-
tion). At the federal level alone, labor market policy
pays for special job creation programs that covered
0,10% of the working age population in 1980, 0,22%
in 1989, 0,84% in 1992, and 0,69% in 1998, Adding
the training measures also organized under "active
labor market policy," the percentage of the work
force funded by the system rose from 0,7% in 1980 to
1,4% in 1989; peaking at 3,5% in 1992, it stood at
1,8% in 1998 (own calculation based on data from the
Federal Ministry of Labor), The Red-Green govern-
ment is pledged to mcreaiespending on labor market
policy, but now finds itself facing severe fiscal con-
straints,
""Passive" labor market measures, including ex-
penditures for early retirement, cost another DM 90
billion per year. The aptness of the name is shown by
a recent OEGD study, which found that in Germany
only about 2% of those receiving unemployment
insurance benefits have their benefits suspended for
refusing to take a job or participate in a training
program. In the United Kingdom the respective
figure is 11%, in Norway, 12%, in the United States,
26%, and in Switzerland, 38% (OEGD Employment
Outlook 2000),
ment insurance contributions, which in-
creased from 3% of gross wages in 1980 to
4,3% in 1990 and 6.5% in 2000, in a period
during which the general tax burden de-
clined. Since social security contributions
directly translate into labor costs, defensive
labor supply management German-style has
the ability to make its underlying assump-
tion of a shrinking "lump of labor" come
true: retiring redundant labor at a high
level of public subsistence funded by pay-
roll taxes drives up the price of the labor of
those still in the market, thereby making it
necessary to retire even more of them.
While it is true that rising labor costs in
Germany in the 1990s were due more to
increases in social security charges than to
wage increases, it is also true that higher
social security charges were needed to pro-
vide compensation for the social exclusion
caused by, and necessary to sustain, an out-
dated wage-setting system that, in alliance
with a contribution-based social security
system, does not allow for employment
growth in cost-sensitive segments of the
service sector.
While reducing non-wage labor costs is
listed among the objectives of the 1998
"Alliance for Jobs," it is not really high on
anybody's agenda, the catastrophic employ-
ment effects of high payroll taxes notwith-
standing. For the unions, protecting the
present pension level, and perhaps even
expanding the opportunities for their mem-
bers to retire early, clearly takes prece-
dence, also because the vast majority of
their members are now either pensioners
or over 50 years old.'"* Although employers
obviously do not like high labor costs, the
large firms have learned to live with them,
and more urgently than cost cutting they
need the cooperation of their works coun-
cils and work forces in industrial restruc-
turing. Finally, for a government bent on
'••Of the 8,623 million members of unions affili-
ated with the DGB in 1997, no more than 494,000, or
5,7%, were 25 years old or younger; in 1985 that
figure was still at about 15%, Also, 18,9% of union
members in 1999 were pensioners, compared to 13,9%
in 1992,
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balancing its budget, lower social security
contributions would make it even more
difficult than it already is to cut the subsi-
dies it is paying to the social security system
out of general tax revenues.'^ In addition
and above all, the deal of the early 1990s
still sticks: the government makes the wel-
fare state available to absorb the costs of the
equality-protecting transfer of West Ger-
man industrial relations to East Germany,
while the "social partners" do not object to
the bill being paid by the parafiscal social
security funds, enabling the government to
avoid raising general taxes and evade po-
litical responsibility for the costs of unifica-
tion.
The negative employment effects of high
non-wage labor costs are especially strong
at the lower end of the labor market. Note
that low employment in this category trans-
lates simultaneously into equality in em-
ployment and exclusion of workers (mostly
unskilled) /roTw employment. To earn take-
home pay of DM 1,600, which given the
level of social assistance is about the mini-
mum one must earn for work to be attrac-
tive, German job seekers must find an em-
ployer willing to put up DM 2,400 for them,
income tax not considered. This amounts
to an effective "employment tax" of 50%
(800 out of 1,600) or 33% (800 out of
2,400), which, to make things worse, is re-
gressive, as it bites much more into lower
incomes. The result is that job seekers
whose productivity is below DM 2,400 are
eliminated from the labor market, even
though they might be able to generate, say,
an income of DM 2,000-—which, if they
could keep it, would sustain them comfort-
ably above the social assistance
'^Indeed, the so-called eco-tax that was introduced
by the Red-Green government to finance a reduction
in social security contributions, in the hope that this
would increase employment, must now be used to
limit the anticipated increasein contributions—which
clearly adds to the difficulties of the government in
defending the tax to a public frustrated with rising
energy prices,
"^Figures are low estimates. In 1997, 34% of the
total labor costs for a single worker earning an aver-
age wage had to be contributed, by the worker or by
Not surprisingly, low labor activity in
Germany is mostly low unskilled labor ac-
tivity. Unions, if they address this issue at
all, defend the present system by arguing
that unlike in the United States, in Ger-
many low-wage employment is morally un-
acceptable, and rather than force people to
work for low wages, society must provide
them with training and other assistance to
get them a "good" job. Accordingly, Ger-
man discussions about the need to expand
service sector employment center on multi-
media and software writing, and on labor
market and training policy to move the
unskilled into the new high-skill and high-
wage employment. Short of this, the present
labor market regime protects workers from
low-wage employment by eliminating them
from gainful employment altogether and
placing them on a social wage even lower
than a low wage—in return for which they
are not expected to do anything other than
quietly suffer the inevitable deterioration
of their employability.
None of this, to be sure, has actually
prevented the growth of a significant low
wage sector in Germany; it has only made it
less visible. There is now in Germany a
growing underground economy, which is
estimated to account for no less than 15%
of GDP. By no means all black market labor
is low-paid, but a good deal is. And while
some of the underground workers have
social protection, others—among them, one
presumes, a majority of the lower-paid—do
not. Furthermore, there is in Germany the
unique institution of "negligible" or "mi-
nor" employment (geringfugige Beschaf-
tigung), which is employment below the
threshold at which social security contribu-
tions are due. At present this is at DM 630
a month, for no more than 15 hours' work
per week. Recent estimates suggest that by
the employer, to the various social security funds, a
level that is exceeded only in France, Italy, Belgium,
Austria, and the Netherlands, The corresponding
figure for Denmark is 10%, for the United States and
Japan, 14%, for the United Kingdom, 17%, and for
Switzerland, 20% (OEGD, Tax/Benefit Position of
Employees 1997),
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late 1999, the number of people holding
jobs of this sort, often more than one, had
grown to about 5.9 million, with an overall
volume of work performed under the 630
Mark regime equivalent to one million full-
time and two million part-time jobs (Apel
et al. 1999). 630 Mark workers are, among
other things, not covered by unemploy-
ment insurance, and they do not accumu-
late pension entitlements. While millions
of unemployed are waiting to enter the
labor market, a large share of the work in
the favorably taxed system of geringfugige
Beschaftigung—which is largely located in
the service sector—is being performed by
people who can afford its conditions: pen-
sioners on early retirement, or safely em-
ployed workers in the primary sector seek-
ing additional tax-free income, competing
with immigrants or young people who can-
not afford not to take 630 Mark jobs as they
are not (yet) entitled to benefits." With the
growth of the black market economy and
the 630 Mark sector, sometimes overlap-
ping on their edges, and behind the veil of
official employment statistics that document
a successful defense of social equality, the
1990s in Germany have witnessed the step-
by-step evolution of a picture-book dual
labor market in which a flexible secondary
sector compensates for the rigidities of a
well-protected primary sector, with a grow-
ing mass of casual workers and immigrants
for whom primary employment and retire-
ment is an exotic world they will almost
certainly never be able to enter.
In the meantime, what used to be indus-
trial conflict over wages and employment
has largely migrated out of the unshakably
stable institutions of industrial relations to
the social policy arena. Here it has become
deeply politicized and has assumed new
forms and acquired new contents. Depend-
ing on the public pension system to under-
write the continuation of collective-bargain-
ing-as-usual, a very high priority for unions
today is to defend the principle that public
pensions should be high enough to pre-
serve a person's standard of living; were
they not, retirement ahead of time would
be much less acceptable for union mem-
bers. The present battle over pension re-
form is therefore fought with no less fervor
by IG Metall than was the 2000 wage round.
Technicalities aside, existing pension lev-
els can be maintained only if either contri-
butions or the effective age of retirement
or both are raised—for demographic rea-
sons, but also because the Finance Minis-
ter, under pressure to consolidate the bud-
get and cut corporate and income taxes at
the same time, is determined to reduce
government subsidies to the social security
system.'^ Given the present composition of
their membership, unions are not neces-
sarily opposed to higher contributions—
which will, after all, be paid mostly by non-
members; indeed they urgently need them,
not simply to keep pensions high but also
for further labor market relief ("Pension at
60"—Rente mit 60—was the slogan of IG
Metall in the last wage round) and still
more "active labor market" training and
assistance programs.
Even if additional revenue could some-
how be generated, however, it can be spent
only once, and in view of the ongoing ero-
sion of the fiscal base of the social security
system—due to low employment, reloca-
tion of economic activity to the under-
ground, the expansion of the 630 Mark
system, and generally an increase in non-
standard employment'*—consolidation of
the pension fund and still earlier retire-
ment pretty much exclude each other. This
is why IG Metall could not win the battle for
Rente mit 60. But it did not lose it, either.
"About 1,2 million of those holding 630 Mark jobs
in 1999 also had jobs in the primary employment
sector (Apel etal, 1999),
"According to the Federal Ministry of Labor (vari-
ous Materialbaende for the Sozialbericht), in 1999 these
amounted to 24,1% of total expenditures of the pen-
sion fund, up from 19,3% in 1991 and 20,3% in 1995,
Government subsidies to the unemployment insur-
ance fund contributed 32,4% to its expendittires in
1998, up from 22,9% in 1989, and down from 34,2%
in 1993,
""Between 1989 and 1996 the number of self-em-
ployed without employees increased by 63%; during
the same period, the share of total employment rep-
resented by standard employment (Normalarbeitsver-
hdltnisse) declined from 75% to 66%,
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The impending social security reform will
gradually lower pensions—mostly new
ones—while simultaneously raising contri-
butions. But in response to both union
pressure and electoral concerns, pensions
will be reduced less than originally planned.
Contributions, in turn, in order not to an-
tagonize the employers and, perhaps, the
actively employed, and also to contain the
resulting increase in non-wage labor costs
with its negative employment effects, will
rise less than the unions would have been
prepared to tolerate. But in agreeing to
raise them at all, and in ruling out raising
the effective age of retirement instead, the
government has abandoned one of its most
important original objectives, which was to
lower non-wage labor costs in order to in-
crease employment. Still, while contribu-
tions will grow in deference to union de-
mands, they will not grow enough to safe-
guard the government from being pun-
ished by the voters for the decline of pen-
sion levels—which is why the reform will
also introduce a funded obligatory system
of supplementary pension insurance. While
this will increase the share of their income
workers are to put aside for their social
security, it will not increase non-wage labor
costs, as contributions are to be paid by
employees only. When IG Metall demanded
that just as in the public system, one half of
the contributions be paid by employers, the
government as a compromise agreed to
subsidize the retirement savings of low-in-
come earners out of general taxes.
What about equality, then? Ask the Turk-
ish immigrant family earning their living
on a combination of 630 Mark jobs, with no
prospect of a wage increase ever and with
almost no social insurance protection; or a
young person facing far higher social secu-
rity contributions than his or her parents,
for what will be a substantially lower pen-
sion; or a 48-year-old long-term unemployed
person with no hope of getting back into
employment; or a woman confined to the
"silent reserve," with no affirmative action
plan or equal employment opportunity of-
fice anywhere near; or one of the growing
number of those in "atypical employment";
or an East German being rotated from "ac-
tive" labor market training into a one-year
employment program, and from there to
unemployment benefits and the next train-
ing program. For them, equality among a
shrinking core work force, with their per-
manent 56-hour-jobs, six weeks of paid va-
cation, and a full pension, at age 58 on
average, is likely to count a lot less than for
Katz and Darbishire, and is surely not worth
its price.
Comment by John Pencavel*
Following Different Paths to Different
Destinations: Comparative Labor Markets
Changes in Labor
Markets across Countries
The labor markets of the relatively
wealthy countries of the world have been
transformed over the past twenty years or
so. One fruitful way to open a discussion of
Harry Katz and Owen Darbishire's book, I
think, is to attempt a simple listing of the
*John Pencavel is Levin Professor of Economics
and Economics Department Ghair, Stanford Univer-
sity,
forces shaping that transformation. To
facilitate exposition and in shocking disre-
gard of geography, in the following discus-
sion I refer to Canada, the United States,
West Europe, Japan, and Australasia as the
"North" and distinguish these countries
from the "South," which consists of "newly
emerging economies" such as China, India,
Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and the coun-
tries of East Europe.' Having settled on this
'What countries are left? Primarily much of Af-
rica, the Asian countries formed out of the former
